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INTRODUCTION
DONALD S. CHISUM*
The articles in this symposium grapple with major contemporary
issues in United States intellectual property law. The topics are signifi-
cant: patent law protection for biotechnology; computer software pro-
tection; the Dillon decision's explication of prima facie obviousness of
chemical inventions; trademark law's incontestability concept; the "file
wrapper estoppel" doctrine's effect on claim scope; the Stewart decision
on renewal copyright owner's rights as to use of authorized derivative
works; and competition policy and intellectual property balanced in the
joint venture context.
This Symposium demonstrates that intellectual property law is a
growth industry in the United States and around the world. Increasing
interest in copyrights, patents, trademarks and related areas is the culmi-
nation of major legal and economic events in the 1970's and 1980's,
including: enactment of the long-awaited Copyright Revision Act of
1976; the energy crisis and erosion of the economic position of the
United States among developed countries, both of which focused atten-
tion on the patent system, which is the traditional means of stimulating
investment in research and development;' two new international patent
conventions-the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the European Patent
Convention; the opening of the People's Republic of China and other
new markets with resulting questions concerning trademark protection
and other industrial property rights; developing countries' demands for
changes in the Paris Convention and for adoption of the code of con-
duct governing the licensing and transfer of technology to other econo-
mies by countries in the developed countries; establishment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over patent matters; negotiations on the interna-
tional harmonization of patent law under the auspices of the World In-
tellectual Property Organization; trilateral discussions among the
United States, Japan and European Patent Offices; focus by the General
* Professor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington; Of Counsel,
Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Orange County, Palo Alto, Walnut
Creek, Sacramento, Washington D.C., New York, Denver, Tokyo, London, Hong Kong,
and Brussels.
1. At no time has there been greater public expectation that the science and technol-
ogy community will devise solutions to dietary, health, environmental, and other
problems. It is to this community that the public and public officials look for the preven-
tion or cure of heart disease, cancer and AIDS, for better biodegradable materials, for
more efficient usage of energy, etc.
The clamor for new technology comes at a time when there is public resistance to
higher taxes, which are necessary to support high levels of government spending on re-
search and development. Universities and private firms increasingly must rely on private
financing for both basic and applied research.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on the trade-related aspects of
intellectual property (TRIPS); and United States adoption of "intent-to-
use" trademark procedures and implementation of the Berne Copyright
Convention.
Apart from these dramatic events, heightened interest in legal
rights in intellectual property is not surprising. Today more than ever,
the products of the mind-aesthetic, technological, and organizational-
constitute humankind's most valuable assets.
One of the most difficult problems confronting companies, practi-
tioners, scholars, and government policy makers concerned with intel-
lectual property law is how to develop fresh approaches to the new
technologies, such as biotechnology, software, semiconductors, and su-
perconductivity. Innovative approaches must take account of trends
around the world, not just in the United States.
Those who prognosticate are doomed to embarrassment, but I will
go out on a limb and identify five trends that are likely to continue
through the 1990's.
* Diminution of national control over intellectual property law policy.
* Increased international scrutiny of the fairness, effectiveness, and ef-
ficiency of domestic intellectual property law systems.
* Harmonization of intellectual property systems.
* Legislative fine-tuning of intellectual property law to accommodate
the needs of new technology industries.
* Moderation of the current movement to strengthen intellectual
property.
A. Diminution of National Control over Intellectual Property Law Policy
Through the 1960's, major industrial countries, especially the
United States, autonomously developed their domestic intellectual
property systems. True, major international conventions, such as the
Paris Convention on patents and trademarks, placed some restraints on
autonomous development. Also, particular countries looked to models
developed elsewhere as instructive guides. Nevertheless, major indus-
trialized countries were not directly constrained by international consid-
erations. Domestic policy makers designed laws on patents, copyrights,
trademarks, trade secrets, and unfair competition to further national in-
terests and to balance the competing interests in free competition and
incentives for the production, disclosure, and development of aesthetic,
technological, and organizational assets.
The 1970's and 1980's saw a diminution in traditional national au-
tonomy over intellectual property law policy. In the United States, for
example, many major intellectual property law changes were driven not
so much by a domestic consensus as by the desirability or necessity of
conforming to international norms or of avoiding putting domestic com-
panies at a competitive disadvantage.
For example, in the United States, many provisions of the 1976
[Vol. 68:2
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Copyright Act 2 were justified primarily by reference to international
norms or constraints. Foremost was the change in copyright term from
fifty-six years to "life of the author plus fifty years." 3 Serious considera-
tion of the proposition that even fifty-six years was too long for all or
some categories of works was precluded because most other countries
belonged to the Berne Convention that dictates the longer term. The
1988 elimination of copyright notice was solely to enable the United
States to join the Berne Convention.
As another example, many policy makers in Japan favored protect-
ing computer software under some specially tailored protection scheme.
Pressure from the United States forced Japan and other countries to fol-
low the American model of copyright protection for software.
In the trademark area, many in the United States favored moving to
an "intent-to-use" registration filing system, but many also opposed it.
Tipping the balance, was the need to avoid putting American companies
at a competitive disadvantage compared to companies in other countries
that had a Paris Convention treaty right to file trademark applications
without showing use.
This trend will surely continue as international sensitivity to the
trade-related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPS) grows. It will be a
major constraint on the intellectual property policy development. In the
United States, it is now commonplace to support or oppose a particular
policy proposal by reference to whether it will set a good or bad prece-
dent that may thereafter be used by other countries. For example, if a
proposal is made that includes a "compulsory license," it will be op-
posed not so much "on the merits" as on the ground that other coun-
tries will cite the United States example in justifying their retention or
adoption of compulsory license provisions that negatively effect the in-
terests of United States companies.
B. Increased International Scrutiny of the Fairness, Effectiveness, and
Efficiency of Domestic Intellectual Property Law Systems
In times past, policy makers in one country often imperfectly under-
stood the workings of other countries' intellectual property systems.
They rarely appreciated the nuisances of law and practice that have a
major impact on the health and competitiveness of national companies
and industries.
In the 1980's, the United States, with qualified support from other
major industrialized countries, began scrutinizing the intellectual prop-
erty systems of its trading partners. It injected the issue of TRIPS into
the current round of GAIT negotiations. The idea is that there should
be minimum standards of property protection, that is, patents, copy-
rights, trademarks, and trade secrets.
Initially, TRIPS proponents assumed that the intellectual property
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-119 (1988).
3. Id. § 303(a).
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systems of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan met and ex-
ceeded any minimum standards. More recently, however, the United
States and Japan have began to question the adequacy of each other's
system, with particular attention on patents. As an example, policy mak-
ers abroad, especially in Japan, now question the fairness and efficiency
of two fundamental aspects of the United States patent system.
First is the first-to-invent priority system, which, unlike every other
major patent system, awards priority of invention between rival claim-
ants based on the first to invent rather than the first to file a patent appli-
cation. To aggravate matters, United States law allows proof of a pre-
filing date of invention only by reference to acts in the United States.
4
To illustrate, if United States company US and Japanese companyJ both
invent a new monoclonal antibody, in their respective countries and on
the same date, the US company gains the United States patent right-
even if theJ company files first and even though theJ company had the
same, or even an earlier, actual invention date. Second is the high cost
and uncertainties of United States patent litigation. Not surprisingly,
United States policy makers find comparable parochial features in the
Japanese patent system.
In addition, current United States trademark law requires a foreign
company to actually use a mark in the United States to maintain protec-
tion. Policy makers abroad criticize such a provision as justifying the
very kind of piracy of marks that American companies decry. A recent
court decision illustrates the point. In Person's Co., Ltd. v. Christman,
5
Christman saw the "Person's" mark in Japan, returned to the United
States, began selling a line of apparel under the "Person's" mark, and
obtained a Lanham Act registration. After Christman's first United
States use date, the Japanese "Person's" company expanded into the
United States. It sought to cancel Christman's registration; the theory
was likelihood of confusion based on Person's prior foreign use. The
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Under United States
trademark law, in a purely domestic case, a junior user of a mark in a
discrete geographic area obtains valid trademark rights in that mark de-
spite prior use of the mark by another in another market only if the jun-
ior user's adoption is in "good faith." The court refused to extend the
"good faith" requirement to the international fact pattern ofjunior and
senior use. It suggested that a different result might obtain if the for-
eign mark were famous in the United States or if the junior user's use
was nominal and with an intent solely to block the prior foreign user's
planned expansion. Neither circumstance was present.
Person 's conclusion may be technically correct, but surely it exposes
United States policy to foreign criticism and weakens the United States'
ability to combat discriminatory and restrictive intellectual property laws
of other countries. The case illustrates a severe limitation on the ability
4. 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988).
5. 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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of United States intellectual property policy to adjust to international
scrutiny.
In other countries, government ministries play activist roles in de-
veloping intellectual property policy. ForJapan, the Ministry of Intellec-
tual Trade and Industry (MITI) plays this role; in Europe, increasingly it
is the European Commission in Brussels. In the United States, much of
the detail in our policies is left to the sometimes chaotic process of litiga-
tion and court decision. That is most evident with software protection
law. Yet, as seen in Person's, courts do not operate with a free hand. The
appeals court in Person's expressed the point poetically: "When the law
has been crafted with the clarity of crystal, it also has the qualities of a
glass slipper: it cannot be shoe-horned onto facts it does not fit, no mat-
ter how appealing they might appear."6
C. Harmonization of Intellectual Property Systems
International conditions press for harmonization of national intel-
lectual property systems. National systems with differing rules inher-
ently create trade barriers, even if each system - considered in isolation
- is fair and efficient.
The need to harmonize intellectual property laws within a common
market is hardly a new idea. The perception of that need by the framers
of the United States Constitution led them to make patents and copy-
rights a matter of federal rather than state concern. The same percep-
tion drove European countries to harmonize their patent laws in the
1970's.
To illustrate the desirability of harmonization, consider the situa-
tion today in which it is commonplace for an invention to be subject to a
patent in the United States but not in Japan or Europe, or vice versa. In
addition to placing countries at competitive disadvantages, such situa-
tions complicate licensing negotiations, place strains on the remedial
structures of our intellectual property laws and pressure companies to
move production facilities for reasons other than efficiency.
Although the need for and benefits of harmonization are clear,
there are also severe drawbacks. The necessity of compromise often
leads to a system that is less than effective and efficient. Furthermore,
harmonized systems are more rigid because a broad consensus is usually
necessary to change them.
D. Legislative Fine-Tuning of Intellectual Property Law to Accommodate the
Needs of New Technology Industries and New Competitive Conditions
Existing laws on patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets
have proven to be remarkably flexible and responsive to the needs of
new technology industries and new competitive conditions. But there is
good reason to believe that the pace of change, together with the inter-
6. Person's, 900 F.2d at 1570.
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national nature of research, development, manufacturing, and informa-
tion flow, will, on occasion, outstrip the capacities of our aging
intellectual property law system. As a result, we can expect periodic
calls for legislative "fine-tuning" of intellectual property laws or even
enactment of wholly new species of protection.
Consider biotechnology. The industry has operated for ten years
on the assumption that patent protection will adequately protect the
fruits of their research and development, fruits so costly to produce but
so cheap to reproduce. Yet it remains unclear whether the patent sys-
tem will really be up to the task. For example, many biotechnology
projects involve extensive laboratory work by skilled scientists. The
technologies used may in fact be "state of the art," and the end product,
though of immense commercial value, may be "obvious" in the patent
law sense because it was a desirable objective that could be achieved
with a reasonable probability of success. If court decisions apply tradi-
tional patent law in that fashion, will we need a carefully crafted but not
overly rigid scheme to preserve incentives for investment in this type of
productivity?
E. Moderation of the Current Movement to Strengthen Intellectual Property
During the 1980's, virtually every significant legislative change in
intellectual property law and policy involved widening or strengthening
the property owner's rights.
Consider the changes in United States patent law in the 1980's
wrought by the Supreme Court and by Congress. As to the Supreme
Court, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,7 it held that genetically altered living
microorganisms constituted patentable subject matter. The Chakrabarty
decision spurred new interest in the patent system, particularly in the
nascent biotechnology industry. In Dawson Chem. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 8
the Court applied section 271(d) of the Patent Act to hold that the
owner of a patent, claiming a process of using a certain chemical com-
pound, was not guilty of patent misuse by selling the compound and
refusing to issue licenses to competing compound manufacturers be-
cause the compound was a "nonstaple," that is, was not suited for com-
mercial use other than in the patented process.
As to Congress, in 1982, it established a Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit and granted it exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases
that arise in whole or in part under the patent laws. 9 Today, the Federal
Circuit's patent-related decisions guide the practical administration of
the patent system in the Patent and Trademark Office, in district court
patent litigation, and in International Trade Commission proceedings
7. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
8. 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
9. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
The Act merged two existing courts, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which had
five judges, and the Court of Claims, which had seven judges. The Federal Circuit came
into existence on October 1, 1982.
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pertaining to patents. Whether the Federal Circuit is excessively "pro-
patent" is a matter of dispute, but few would argue that it has dampened
incentives to obtain and enforce patents.
In the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984,10 Congress adopted
amendments to sections 103, 116 and 120 of the Patent Act, to allow
freer exchange of information among members of research teams."I It
also made exportation of components of a patented combination an act
of infringement. 12 The same year, it enacted the Drug Price Competi-
tion and Patent Term Restoration Act,' 3 providing for extension of the
terms of certain patents on drug and other products that had been sub-
ject to regulatory review by the Food and Drug Administration. In
1988, it enacted the Patent Misuse Reform Act, 14 restricting application
of the misuse doctrine to certain patent licensing and sales practices.
The same year, it enacted the Process Patent Amendments Act,' 5 ex-
tending to owners of process patents the right to exclude unauthorized
importation of unpatented products made abroad by use of the patented
process.
In the 1990's, there will be calls to moderate the expanded scope of
intellectual property rights to accommodate legitimate interests. These
interests include not only the cost concerns of users and the effect on
product market competition but also the impact of expansive protection
of early, basic steps in the development of technology on the incentives
to develop and improve the technology.
10. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383.
11. See id. § 104.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 271(0 (1988).
13. Pub. L. No. 98-417, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
14. Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-73, 102 Stat. 4674. The Act
added two subsections to 35 U.S.C. § 271(d).
15. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. IX,
subtit. A, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
1991]

